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PREFACE

Few other initiatives of government are as politically popular and publicly
beguiling as jobs programs. And few others also have a more distorting influence
on the dynamics of the economy.

In this working paper, Richard McKenzie

examines the commonly observed and widely applauded elements of jobs programs
and traces their course to the deadening effects they have on productivity,
entrepreneurship and the standard of living.
A notable value of McKenzie's argument is the connection it rnakes between
.

.

the foreboding insight of the late Harvard economist Joseph Schumpeter and the
energetic mindset of national and state policy makers who are proving Schumpeter
right.

Schumpeter warned that the creative forces of capitalism would lead to

extraordinary defense of the economic status quo.
.

•

McKenzie recounts recent

I

politically successful initiatives to "save" jobs-providing industrial operations
that are near perfect models of Schumpeter's fears come true.

In t_hat light,
.

federal jobs-creating programs, state imitations of them, and an array of
unrelated economic policy rigidities touted as saving or creating jobs are
examined in this paper to reveal America's political fetish with jobs, and its
'

growing innocence of productivity.
A particular worth of McKenzie's review of this scene is the parallel he
draws between the gold fetish of mecantilism and our own policy makers' devotion
to the idea of jobs.

The mercantilist sustained a policy vision that a nation's

wealth and power were measured by its stocks of gold, and thereby used the
devices of government to shape trade policy, limit competition and enrich
themselves at the expense of their national community. Most of our advocates of
spending and regulatory programs that are promoted to save jobs or create new
job opportunities serve similarly narrow ends.
.

And they significantly block the

growth of productivity that is the hallmark of our time over the time of the
.mercantilists.
McKenzie is among those too few economists who write as well as they think,
offering access to his discipline and insight to the broadest possible audience. This
paper exemplifies scholarship made relevant by common sense argument.
doubly important for its potential to inform general readers.
f

Thomas P. Inman
Editorial Page Editor
The Greenville News

It is
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''JOBILISM'': THE NEW THEOLOGY OF PUBLIC POLICY
In 1980, General Motors announced plans to close two outmoded Fisher Body
plants in Detroit and to replace two plants with one new $BOO-million Cadillac
plant. GM told Detroit city fathers that if a suitable site could not be found, the
company would locate its new plant elsewhere. Many jobs were at stake-
potentially as many as 6,000.
Under the banner of·· preserving jobs, Detroit responded by condemning,
.. ,

through its powers of eminent domain, a 320-acre section of the city known as
.

.

Polijtown, encompassing 127 businesses, 16 churches, and 1,75~ ·residences in
'

the mainly Polish community, and selling the land to GM for far less than the
purchase price.

1

Because several of the life-long residents would not voluntarily

sell out, the city used force to evict. them.
City fathers were unmoved by objections that state powers were being used
for the · private gain of a large corporation--in fact, the largest corporation,
•

measured by sales, in the United States. They were equally unswayed by television
r

news reports showing city citizens, some of whom were elderly, being dragged
•

from their homes immediately before bulldozers reduced the buildings to
splinters. Something much more important than moral principle or social
condemnation was at issue--jobs.
Jobs have always been important to public assessment of economic activity.
After all, jobs are the principal way most people earn their livelihood. But, in the
1980s, because of mounting concern over economic change, jobs have becom~
something of a national o·bsession--a holy grail to be pursued for its ow·n sake, a

prima facie justification for new directions in public policy.
What is now remarkable about the DetroiVGM land appropriation made in
the name of preserving jobs is that it is no longer unusual. It is the type of policy
that has become a part of the prevailing social ethic, captured by an awkward
rubric, "job ii ism."

And jobilism--an analytica·I mind set that focuses political

attention on "jobs" as a meaningful measurement of national success and failure-
has flourished in the 198Qs. It is at the core of the public debate over what, if
anything, should be done about the restructuring American economy.
This new public policy "ism" is neither totally unexpected nor new. The late
great Harvard economist Joseph Schumpeter warned that capitalism, which is the
mother of economic progress, means constant change, if not turmoil .2 He feared
that change--which jeopardizes established jobs, incomes, and market

,

shares--would not be tolerated in democracies. As a consequence, capitalism
would not be allowed to flourish.
Jobilism, in many essential respects, is a throwback to mercantilism. Both
isms have similar policy goals, not the least of which is the delegation of powers
of international and domestic market control to the state. Both are largely guided
by the social fetishes of their respective eras. The mercantilists had their gold
fetish. The modern jobilists have their job fetish. Both isms are equally flawed
for much the same reasons.

THE EMERGENCE AND SPREAD

OF JOBILISM

Modern jobilism emerged abruptly in the Great Depression when the federal
government took on the responsibility of creating work for the hordes of
unemployed. It was fostered in the 1960s with the acceptance of Keynesian

economics that promised relief of unemployment through government deficit
spending and its "rr1ultiplier effect" on incom.e and jobs. However, in more recent
years jobilism has developed in varied and creative forms, no longer restricted to

the Detroit/GM-style land grab.
In 1982, the depth of the most recent recession, International Harvester
{now called Navistar) began to close and consolidate several of its
heavy-equipment plants. In one plant closing, Harvester informed Fort Wayne,
Indiana, and Springfield, Ohio, that one of their plants would be closed. At the same
time, Harvester asked each city to consider buying its plant and leasing it back to
Harvester. .By September 1982, each city had reciprocated and offered to pay

Harvester $30 million or more. 3
Harvester needed an infusion of capital; Fort Wayne and Springfield needed to
protect their declining job bases. The Fort Wayne plant was closed; its job losses

were understandably reported in the media with almost the same gloom as combat
casualties were reported during the Vietnam Era. The city had been in a municipal

economic battle of sorts and had lost.
The mounting job losses in the 1982 recession could not, of course, escape
the attention of Congress, which responded in the only way it knew how, through
the passage of a "jobs bill."

The $9 billion in additional funding mainly for

highway and bridge construction passed that year was advertised as the annual
economic salvation for 350,000 unemployed American workers. Through the
stroke of its legislative pen, Congress was confident that its construction program

would create that many jobs. The program, however, was pronounced a failure in

2

1987 when the Government Accounting Office reported that the 1983 jobs bill
had actually added no more than 35,000 jobs during any given year. 4
Now, in the late 1980s,- all levels of government have joined the foray for

jobs, jobs, and more jobs. To no small degree, jobilism has become the new
political and economic theology. The central purpose of economic activity under
this new theology is to produce jobs, not necessarily goods and services that
people need and want.
The number of jobs saved and created by this or that public or private action
has become the modern-day body count of economic development. The United States
is "restructuring"--much worse, the nation is "deindustrializing" or is becoming
a "service economy" or is broaching the "informational age."

Economic

development is measured not so much by relative production of goods and services
consumers want, but by changes in the measured distribution of employment
across industries.
Never mind that the industrial production index is at an all-time high. Never
mind that production of "goods" has remained more or less constant, as a percent
of real gross national output, over the past three or more decades. Never mind that
the productivity of the manufacturing sector continues to rise relative to other
sectors of the economy. 5
Policy pundits still warn that the U.S. economy may enter the twenty-first
century as a "productionless society," a nation of "short-order cooks and
saleswomen, Xerox-machine operators and messenger boys. . . . To let other
.

countries make things while we concentrate on services is debilitating both in its
6
substance and in its symbolism.'' The widely publicized decline of the "goods

economy" is largely founded on the drop, not in production, but in "production
jobs," measured in absolute numbers and, more dramatically, as a percent of total
employment. 7
National pride is supposed to ride on those official counts of jobs. President
Reagan talks with great pride about the 11 million jobs created during the first
six years of his administration and tells the nation that the country's economic
goal should be eight million more jobs creat~d during the remainder of the decade
and 20 million during the rest of the century .8 The president's supporters parrot
his claims; 9 his detractors admonish the public to look behind the job totals and
realize that the holders of a majority of those newly created jobs can barely earn
a subsistence living. 1 0
Regardless of how the debate over the "quality" of the nation's stock of jobs is
settled, one thing is sure: modern policy debates have implicitly endowed the
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president with responsibility for job creation and destruction--power no one
mortal could have, much less should have.
Understandably, the responsibility for the job structure has begun to be
shared by many other government officials. On practically any day of the week,
some state governor, accompanied by economic development officials, is trekking
the world on what has come to be known as the "Great Industrial Job Hunt." Jobs
have become the political "bacon" of this decade.
Many Americans are troubled by the importation of foreign goods because
imported goods supposedly destroy domestic jobs. Americans are not bothered by
the importation of capital because money supposedly creates jobs. They see the
country entangled in an international competitive struggle over a more or less
fixed stock of jobs--a struggle that gives rise to the beggar-thy-neighbor
mentality. Importing goods is the mirror image of exporting jobs; exporting goods
reflect the importing of jobs.
Almost without fail hometown newspapers report the closing or opening of
local plants, measured most prominently not by changes in community production
of valued goods and services but by the expected number of jobs lost or gained. In
the spring of 1987, Congress, unrepentant of its past errors in calculating the
social benefits of its legislative efforts to increase employment for American
workers, passed a "budget-busting" $BB-billion highway bill.
Claiming that he had not seen so much lard since he gave out blue ribbons at
an Iowa state fair, President Reagan vetoed the legislation. 11 Undeterred, the
Democrat-controlled Congress overrode the veto because, by the time the final
vote was taken, the legislation was no longer a highway bill. It was a "jobs bill."
As many as 800,000 construction jobs were on the line, or so claimed those
members of Congress who were backing the bill.
Jobs have become the new-found political currency in Washington politics.
Legislative deals are closed--based on how the proposed funding distributes jobs
across congressional districts.
Practically every economic bill before Congress is now touted as a "jobs
bill."

Protectionism is a boon to jobs, a claim that supposedly neutralizes the

baneful connotation of the policy. Protectionists calculate the number of jobs
12
saved by tariffs and quotas.
"Competitiveness," a much-abused buzzword, has

become a code word for encouraging job creation and easing the pains of job
destruction. Expenditures for proposed federal training and retraining are pushed
as efficient methods of job creation, and plant closing restrictions are
recommended for their capacity to stave off job destruction. 13

4

Historically, firms have sold "goods" and "services."

Now, they sell "jobs"

to willing federal, state, and local government buyers. Since the days of the WPA
(ridiculed as standing for "We Piddle Along") in the Great Depression, federal
politicians have bought jobs with federal programs. States and communities have
conventionally disguised their purchases of jobs through industrial subsidies for
plants, roads, water lines, and a variety of other enticements. Now they disguise
their purchases of questionable plants, roads, and water projects with "job
creation" bills.
Almost all states are in the business of bidding for jobs with financing, tax
abatements and subsidies.

South Carolina has more recently agreed to drop

partially the subsidy veil by providing firms with a "jobs creation tax credit" for
five years, ranging from $300 to $1,000 per year per new job "created." 1 4
With little apparent thought, the South Carolina legislature gave Mack Truck the
keys to the state treasury, handing over more than $16 million in state-financed
benefits, all for the sake of 850 jobs. 15 Few in the state legislature were willing
to stop and ask if Mack Truck, which at the time was a financially troubled
company, would be able to pull itself out of the red or if the 4,200 Mack workers
I

in Pennsylvania would have first claim on the South Carolina jobs (which the
courts ruled in mid-1987 they did have). 16 Unfortunately for South Carolina
taxpayers, because of 1987 court rulings regarding the job rights of Mack
workers at closed plants in Pennsylvania, only half of the Mack jobs in South
Carolina will probably go to South Carolinians.
Iowa has removed the subsidy facade, offering identified firms $3,000 in
cash (from its lottery revenues) for each job that the firm brings to the state and
maintaining that direct cash payments are a much more efficient means of job
recruitment than in-kind payments for roads and retraining programs. No wonder
employers now regularly pit communities and states against one another in a
competitive struggle for the jobs they have to sell.
THE GOLD FETISH OF MERCANTILISM

In many important respects, "jobilism" has become, in the latter part of the
'

twentieth century, what "mercantilism" was to an earlier epoch: a half-baked,
simplistic, and fundamentally flawed rationalization for extended government
7
1
control of the economy .
Mercantilism, a governing policy vision prominent

from the sixteenth century through the first half of the eighteenth century, was
premised extensively (but not exclusively) on the simple-minded view that the
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wealth and international power of a country could be assessed by its hoard of gold.
The larger the stock of gold, the larger the country's wealth and national power.
While scholars disagree over why gold was held in such high esteem and how
successful mercantilism was in achieving its objectives, there is little debate
over the fact that mercantilists sought to enlarge their country's gold reserves
through governmental controls on trade. 18 In the absence of gold mines, a
country's gold reserve could be increased principally through an excess of exports

over imports, or a balance-of-trade surplus.
If payments for internationally traded goods were made in gold coins or
bullion, then a trade surplus necessarily meant more gold flowing in than flowing
out, and a buildup of the domestic hoard. A trade deficit meant the opposite, a loss
of gold. A growing domestic hoard of gold implied increasing wealth, since gold was
intrinsically valuable. More gold also implied greater national power, because the
accumulated gold hoard could, in times of war or other national emergencies, be
drawn

down

to

buy

military

equipment

and

hire

mercenary

forces.

Mercantilists' gold fetish justified governmental efforts to reduce imports
and expand exports. Accordingly, policies that increased the prices of imports-
for example, tariffs and quotas--and decreased the prices of exports--for
example, subsidies and favorable government treatment--were perceived to be
constructive, not destructive. So what if trade was impaired by mercantilist
policies, the nation's gold hoard was enhanced. The stature of the state was also
magnified. Of course, for many mercantilists, noble talk about the enlargement of
the nation's gold hoard was hardly more than a convenient intellectual
smokescreen. It was intended to obfuscate their true, and far more base, purpose
--the suppression of domestic and foreign competition via government controls

and the increase of their personal profits.
From this perspective, mercantilism amounted to an economic regime
propelled, in part, by what economists now call "rent seeking," the manipulation
of public powers for private gain, under the guise of attaining wholly nationalistic
objectives.

19

Mercantilist controls increased the rents of politicians and

government workers by increasing the demand for government services, of
domestic import-competing industries by reducing the demand for foreign goods,
and of gold owners by increasing the demand for gold they had to sell. In effect,
supporters of mercantilism comprised a coalition of "bootleggers and Baptists,"
otherwise

odd-policy

bedfellows--nationalists,

rent

seekers,

and

gold

bugs--whose varied personal objectives could be achieved by the same sets of
market controls and, at the same time, could be obscured behind the veil of gold. 20

6

Adam Smith was one of the first prominent critics to pierce the veil of gold,
pointing out in his The Wealth of Nations that a country's wealth could best be
identified by its productive capacity and ability to trade with others across the
globe.

21

By suppressing mutually beneficial trades, mercantilist controls

obstructed production and development of wealth.
Smith spent much of his seminal treatise making a simple point: hoarded gold
represents foregone production opportunities, foregone trades, and foregone
wealth and social improvement, because gold held in storage could be used to buy
more productive assets. Economic improvement as the end of economic activity
could not be, as the mercantilists maintained, congruent with the accumulation of
idle gold. Rather, gold hoards were the antithesis of economic improvement,
especially when generated by artificial, government-inspired market controls.

THE HOARDING OF JOBS

Jobilism, as a guiding economic and social philosophy, advances policy
discussions hardly beyond the dictates of mercantilism, now intellectually defunct
for two centuries. It simply substitutes production jobs for gold on the implied
assumption that gold is not "all that glitters."
Jobilism holds that the stock of the nation's jobs is its hoard of gold, to be
augmented by various public controls on markets. Imports are to be discouraged
because they cause the exportation of jobs; exports, encouraged because they give
rise to the importation of jobs, or so it is thought.
The country's economic strength and competitiveness are thereby assessed in
terms of its balance of trade, which supposedly mirrors, with only minor
distortions, the balance of international job flows, and which supposedly records
changes in the nation's hoard of jobs. Under jobilism, job creation is to be
subsidized; job destruction, penalized. The world power and prestige of a nation
are determined by its accumulation of jobs--not gold, just jobs, preferably the
types of jobs that have been around for some time. Taken to its logical extreme,
'

which has been done by many modern jobilists, jobilism is nothing less than a
euphemism for socialism with an updated rhetorical twist.
As was the case under mercantilism, much of the political attention given to
job creation and destruction is fostered by strong and persuasive rent-seeking
forces. The country's fascination with jobs becomes a convenient smokescreen,
and the private interests of rent seekers are promoted at public costs. For
example, the steel, motorcycle, and textile industries push their protectionist
measures on the grounds that Congressional action will save and expand jobs in

7

their industries. These industries rarely acknowledge that--through policy
induced shifts in consumer purchases--their profits or rents are raised while
the welfare of those who consume these products is lowered. Similarly, in the
name of more jobs, the construction industry lobbies hard for highway bills,
never mentioning the rents embedded in its favored legislation.
Much like the mercantilists, most jobilists downplay the proposal's costs,
measured in terms of lost production and alternative employment opportunities.
Jobilists prefer to insist that the relevant stock of jobs that should be hoarded
includes their jobs because their jobs (like gold) are "good jobs," intrinsically
valuable and a part of the country's "basic (established) industries."
Modern jobilists also have much in common with the physiocrats, who
followed the mercantilists and who believed that industrial growth should be
thwarted because agriculture was the ultimate source of national wealth and
22
power.
Similarly, modern jobilists tell us that the shift toward service
employment should be thwarted via special policy concessions for manufacturing.
After all, we are now told, "Manufacturing matters mightily to the wealth and
power of the United States and to our ability to sustain the kind of open society we
have come to take for granted. If we want to stay on top--or even high up--we
can't just shift out of manufacturing and up into services, as some would have

it. "

23

Jobi lists are neophysiocrats who see the nation's wealth and power in

plants, not acres of land.
Like the physiocrats,

modern jobilists obscure the extraordinary

complexity of centralizing the design of' the nation's employment structure-
encompassing literally hundreds of millions of existing and potential jobs--by
dividing the economy into halves, "manufacturing" and "services." However, they
actually know precious little about which and how many manufacturing and
service jobs should be allowed to thrive--or die.
If Smith could return today, he would probably once again remind
policymakers that the hoarding of any given, identified stock of jobs, as in the case
of gold, amounts to lost economic opportunities. The country must be poorer and
its existing jobs actually worth less--the same condition that existed when gold
was hoarded in the mercantilist era--even though plant and equipment, which
could have been bought with the gold, were more productive. Smith would
probably say, just as with the mercantilists' gold fetish, that the jobilists' job
fetish can be expected to lead to exactly the reverse of what was intended. He would
•

say that jobilism can only lead to myopic, counter-productive policies, the
sapping of the nation's long-run economic vitality--a loss of its competitiveness!

8

The absurdity of jobilism's fundamental premise--that nations should be
judged by the count and security of their jobs--is fully apparent when it is
realized that China, Poland, and the Soviet Union fit the jobilist's model of world
class economies. Those countries have managed to create and insure jobs for
practically everyone--at the expense of considerable economic progress. They
have avoided the turmoil of capitalism to the point that sleeping on the job has
become a major management problem. The jobilists in the Soviet Union have
dominated public policy forums for so long that the country has far more jobs
than work.
The United States could easily match that kind of "success." All it would have
to do is set a policy course of returning to the efficiency of the industrial and
service sectors like those of the Soviet Union or Poland or China. Of course, there
are jobilists who want to do just that, albeit indirectly, by guaranteeing
"workers' rights to their jobs" and by imposing additional taxes on capital to
finance job bills. 24

THE INHERENT POLITICAL BIAS IN JOBILISM
Half a century ago, Professor Schumpeter warned the policymakers of his
day that the fatal flaw of capitalism was likely to be its creativeness and energy,
not its failures to achieve greater income, wealth, and opportunity. 25 With
unusual insight, Schumpeter saw destruction in the successes of capitalism.
However, Schumpeter called the capitalistic process of perennial renewal
"creative destruction," seeking to emphasize that economic improvement always
involves replacing lower-quality products with better-quality products--the
less productive capital and workers with the more productive. He saw in the
history of progress a saga of job destruction, but he also saw its destructiveness
as the foundation of most economic success, measured by more valuable jobs that
are created.
Unfortunately, Professor Schumpeter correctly feared that democracies
might not allow capitalism to flourish because they cannot politically tolerate its
destructiveness. Undue policy concern with avoiding the destructive power of
capitalism--by preserving the status quo

in,

for

example, jobs--would

inevitably cap progress. The process of economic renewal would necessarily be
slowed by an array of governmental taxes, expenditures, and obstructions to
trade. Professor Schumpeter could not have been more prophetic.

9

The contemporary contention of policymakers that "jobs" are a meaningful
measure of the success or failure of the United States economy is fraught with
three principal problems, all of which have political origins. The first problem
relates to the fact that the main concern of politics is distributing and
redistributing people's "rights."

Politicians are all too inclined to look upon jobs

as "things," much like gold, that can be owned and stored, whereas it may be more
accurate to say that jobs represent the intersection of the private interests of
workers and employers. Jobs represent exchanges of rights that must be made by
the parties involved to suit their interests. Under jobilism, the government has
the power to negotiate exchanges of rights in employment situations. These
exchanges will be made, in spite of the fact that government officials may have
little appreciation of the individual circumstances of the people affected.
The second political problem inherent in jobilism is that widespread
political fascination with producing jobs will in many instances inadvertently
.

hand over to firms significant powers that exploit the public treasury. This was
true in the cases of GM and International Harvester discussed earlier in this
essay. GM and Harvester would not have had the economic power to extract the
municipal concessions they did if the cities had not had the economic wherewithal
to bargain for the jobs.26
The third and most important problem is that the public debate, conducted
•

(as it must be} in a political arena, is necessarily unbalanced and unrepresented.
People with existing jobs, who may want protection from the creative destruction
of capitalism, can be fully represented in the political debate because the
politicians know who they are and the nature of the Jobs they have.
Nonetheless, people who may take the new jobs of the future (who represent
the "creative" dimension of "creative destruction"} are not nearly so well defined
politically. Many of the people who will take the future jobs do not now exist
(they are unborn} or are not yet a part of an established, "basic" industry with
established grips on Washington-based controls. 27
Unfortunately, at the expense of the politically unrepresented, policy debates
are all too frequently settled with
mischief;
political
concessions
are
typically
.
made to the established and well-represented interest groups.

Because jobilism

involves an unbalanced political debate, it represents a serious threat to the
vitality of American capitalism--its "competitiveness."
The expected imbalance in the political debate was never more clearly
demonstrated than in the Senate vote over the $88-billion highway bill on April
Fool's Day 1987. The vote to override President Reagan's veto was close--indeed,
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within a vote. Torn between siding with his party or with the President over the
1987 $88-billion highway bill, Senator Sanford voted "present" on the first
role-call vote. Later he changed his vote to uphold the President's veto. 2 8
Because Senator Sanford's change of heart was crucial, the final vote was
held up by parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, steel and construction
workers crowded into Sanford's office and pleaded with members of the senator's
office staff for Senator Sanford to acknowledge, in his decision, that their jobs
were at stake.

29

News reports on the lobbying efforts made no mention of the

North Carolina senator being confronted by people who might lose their jobs
because of the higher gasoline or income taxes or higher deficits, because these
people could not be identified.
Exactly why Senator Sanford changed his mind and voted to override the veto
is not clear; the politics of how the highway funds would be distributed across
states was a significant factor. 30

There were probably many other political

forces coming to bear on the North Carolina senator (as well as on every other
senator who did not waffle on the issue). What is perfectly clear, however, is that
the veto was overridden in the name of jobs, but not just any jobs. The veto was
overridden for the types of jobs represented by the people in Senator Sanford's
office. The workers had good reason to be there; they intended to unbalance the
debate by reminding politicians by their presence of the value of existing jobs.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Is job creation, apart from any corresponding increase in output, the proper
measure of economic success? That is the crucial question jobilists pose. If it is,
then the country can forget all those costly and complex programs to make
America "competitive."

Th.ere is a simple one-line statute that will create 60

million jobs overnight. Outlaw farm machinery.
The very absurdity of the suggestion reveals a radical notion: The country
would better measure economic success the way corporate heads are beginning to
do, by the elimination of jobs. That proposition may sound sacrilegious, but
consider its implications. Economic progress has two legs. One is the elimination
of jobs with new technology, the other finding new tasks for workers. In the past
century we have taken farmers off the land and made them teachers, nurses, and
store clerks, thereby raising the country's standard of living.
Now, which is more difficult, job elimination or job creation?

Is the basic

problem the country faces a shortage of tasks that need doing? Or is it a shortage
of farm machinery? From the perspective of these questions' obvious answers,

11

.

"jobs" are everywhere abundant. The country's fundamental problem is finding

ways that people, not government, can discover improved employment
opportunities, not just things to do. The creative process inevitably involves

replacement.
Contrary to what might be thought, both market and political processes
destroy "jobs."

Certainly, jobs are destroyed through price changes caused by

shifts in supply and demand forces. Just as surely, however, jobs are destroyed
through votes and taxes in the political process.
The question policymakers too often overlook or choose to ignore is whether
the market process or the political process is more creative in the process of
being destructive. Markets definitely destroy current jobs, but politics just as
surely destroy future jobs by obstructing, delaying, or redirecting the
restructuring of the stock of current jobs.
T·he contemporary policy debate over the restructuring of the American
economy is understandable. People everywhere have a natural inclination to avoid
change, especially when change requires adjustment to previously unknown
competitive forces. People wish to avoid change even when new and improved
products, innovative production processes, and employment opportunities emerge.
When government is endowed with powers of intervention that are checked only by
democratic votes, the public should not be at all surprised that political outcomes
cater to the current distribution of jobs, at the expense of new distributions of
jobs. The public should also not be surprised to learn that Washington drains the
creativeness of capitalism as politicians become embroiled in rent-seeking policy
I

skirmishes over how the powers of government shall affect the distribution of
jobs.
The concerns raised in this essay are hardly matters of theoretical
abstractions. Jobilism has a long and honorable history in European countries.
With industrial and labor policies designed largely to save established jobs, major
European countries have managed to bring job creation almost to a halt. American
citizens and policymakers have that stark record to review. It is hoped they will
learn from that real-world experience.
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FOOTNOTES

Detroit bought the property for about $200 million ($150 million of this
amount coming from federal funding of the project) and sold the property to GM
for slightly more than $8 million. For more details on the destruction of
Poletown, see Sheldon Richman, "The Rape of Poletown," Inquiry, August 3, and
24, 1981; "Council Opposes GM Detroit Land Grab," Competition (Washington:
Council for a Competitive Economy, May 1981 ).
2

Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2nd ed. (New
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, Inc., 1947), chap. 7.
3

Fort Wayne initially made a sale-leaseback bid of $9 million for a
60-year-old plant, but later raised its bid to $31 million after Springfield bid
$30 million for a 15-year-old plant. For more details on the bidding between
Springfield and Fort Wayne, see "Springfield-Worker: We'd Just Like to Have
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